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THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
UNDER THE TAYLOR LAW: SUPREME COURT
DEVELOPMENT, NEW YORK STATE




The duty of fair representation was born in Supreme Court case law
both as an antidote to racial discrimination in employment and as an
essential concomitant to the exclusivity of union representation in the
collective bargaining process.' It later became as much a prescription
for deference to union discretion as a source of protection for individ-
ual employees against arbitrary union rule.2 Currently, it is more a
minimal safeguard against wholly irrational and invidious union con-
duct than a significant guarantee of competent, committed and equal
representation.3
It has been nearly half a century since the Supreme Court first rec-
ognized the duty of fair representation in federal labor law.4 Almost a
quarter century thereafter, in 1967, the New York legislature enacted
the Taylor Law - officially the Public Employees' Fair Employment
Act.5 In the twenty-five years since then, the federal doctrine of fair
representation has been adopted and adapted for application under
* Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University.
This Article is based on a presentation delivered to the CONFERENCE ON THE
TAYLOR LAW: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, sponsored by the Albany Law School's Government Law Center, May
1992. The author is indebted to Karina Thomas whose thorough research and good ear
were essential to the conference presentation, to Kathryn L. Clune who skillfully and
expeditiously helped draft the background section in preparation for publication, and to
Emily Pedro who cheerfully and patiently typed the manuscript. Finally, my wife
Karen's encouragement is always critical; and this is for Richie, our middle son, who
always helps in his special way.
1. See Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
2. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1970); Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
3. See Airline Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127 (1991); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990).
4. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
5. L. 1967, ch. 392, § 2 (codified as amended at N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-214
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993)).
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that statute to public sector labor relations in New York.6 Indeed, a
recent amendment to the Taylor Law makes the duty of fair represen-
tation explicit.7 The amendment does not define the duty, however.
It can only be determined, if at all, from an examination of the deci-
sional law of New York's Public Employment Relations Board
("PERB") and of the state's courts.
The purpose here is not to provide a definition, but to identify the
definitional sources in federal and state case law and to offer a pro-
posal. Part II of this Article will present background history behind
both the National Labor Relations Act and the Taylor Law. Part III
will outline the Supreme Court's decisions articulating standards for
the duty of fair representation. 9 Part IV will trace the incorporation
and application of the duty of fair representation in New York deci-
sions resolving disputes under the Taylor Law. The Article will con-
clude with a prescription for Taylor Law independence from federal
labor law, with particular emphasis on standards of fair representa-
6. See generally Harold R. Newman, The Duty in the Public Sector, in THE CHANG-
ING LAW OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 85 (Jean T. McKelvey ed., 1985).
7. L. 1990, ch. 467, § 4 (codified at N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-a(2)(c) (McKinney
Supp. 1993)).
8. PERB is the administrative adjudicatory authority under the Taylor law. See
N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 205 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993).
9. There is a wealth of literature examining the Supreme Court's standards or sug-
gesting others. The sources consulted for the brief sketch here include: THE CHANGING
LAW OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 6; THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
(Jean T. McKelvey ed., 1977); Robert A. Sugarman & L.B. Hunt, The "Arbitrary" Stan-
dard: The Duty of Fair Representation in Collective Bargaining Negotiations, 22 STETSON
L. REV. 133 (1992); Lee M. Modjeska, The Supreme Court and the Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1991); Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of
Fair Representation: What the Courts Do In Fact, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 89 (1985); David L.
Gregory, A Call for Supreme Court Clarification of the Union Duty of Fair Representa-
tion, 29 ST. LoUis U. L.J. 45 (1985); Stanley J. Schwartz, Different Views of the Duty of
Fair Representation, 34 LAB. L.J. 415 (1983); Lea S. Vander Velde, A Fair Process Model
for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983); Clyde W. Sum-
mers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Consti-
tutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977); Julia Penny Clark, The Duty
of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973); Archibald
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Archibald Cox,
The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957); Maureen A. McGhee,
Comment, The Duty of Fair Representation: The Emerging Standard of the Union's Duty
in the Context of Negligent, Arbitrary, or Perfunctory Grievance Administration, 46 Mo. L.
REV. 142 (1981); Rita A. Bartnik, Note, Can Negligent Representation Be Fair Represen-
tation: An Alternative Approach to Gross Negligence Analysis, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
537 (1980); Neva S. Flaherty, Note, Determining Standards For a Union's Duty of Fair
Representation: The Case For Ordinary Negligence, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1980);
Alan Sorkowitz, Note, Labor Arbitration, The Duty of Fair Representation, And Union
Negligence, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 357 (1980); David J. Griffith, Comment, Protection of
Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining: The Need for a More Definitive Standard of
Fair Representation Within the Vaca Doctrine, 14 VILL. L. REV. 484 (1969).
TAYLOR LAW
tion based on New York State policies, principles and purposes under-
lying the Taylor Law, rather than on Supreme Court standards based
on corresponding federal considerations in private sector labor.
II. Historical Background of Relevant Statutes
To lend perspective to the examination of the duty of fair represen-
tation, it might be helpful briefly to review l° the historical background
and public policy considerations underlying the enactment of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")11 and the Taylor Law.
Throughout the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centu-
ries, industrial strife plagued the United States. In the early 1800's,
concerted employee activity12 was considered a common law conspir-
acy, punishable by criminal prosecution.13 The turn of the century,
however, marked the use of the civil injunction in state courts as a
more effective weapon against union activity.14 Simultaneously, fed-
eral courts provided employers with additional ammunition to fight
unionization in the form of the antitrust statutes.1 5
A turning point in the labor movement was the gradual change in
both the judicial and legislative attitudes towards employee rights. 6
Federal legislation especially reflected this growing sensitivity. 7 In
1935, Congress enacted the NLRA, 18 affirmatively declaring that em-
ployees' rights included: "the right to self-organize, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."19
10. The general overview in this section relies heavily upon the following sources:
RONALD DONOVAN, ADMINISTERING THE TAYLOR LAW (1990); JEROME LEFKOWITZ,
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1988); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1976).
11. C.372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
12. The activity, in the form of strikes, picketing and boycotts of employers or their
products, was in support of demands for higher wages and improved working conditions.
GORMAN, supra note 10, at 1.
13. See id.
14. See id. Temporary restraining orders were readily obtainable in ex parte proceed-
ings based solely upon the employer's affidavit. Such orders were usually sufficient to
destroy a union's strength. Id. at 1-2.
15. The Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914 were deemed to provide
federal courts with federal question jurisdiction over "combinations" of workers that in-
terfered with interstate commerce; treble damages were available. See GORMAN, supra
note 10, at 2-3.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 3-4.
18. Otherwise known as the Wagner Act of 1935. See supra note 11.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (emphasis added).
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The declared policy of the statute was to prevent the obstruction of
interstate commerce through the use of strikes or other concerted ac-
tivity "by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjust-
ment of industrial disputes rising out of differences as to wages, hours,
or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees."20 By statutorily protect-
ing the right to engage in concerted activities, Congress strengthened
the employees' voice in the collective bargaining process.2' The
NLRA also created the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"),
an administrative agency charged with oversight and enforcement of
the statutory mandates.22
Following the enactment of the NLRA and the end of World War
II, the United States witnessed an escalation in both union member-
ship and labor disputes.23 In 1946, more than five million employees
struck in 4,630 reported work stoppages, affecting every basic indus-
try.24 Amidst this wholesale industrial disruption nationwide, unrest
in New York State's public sector became problematic. 25 Strikes 26 in-
terrupted vital government services, causing the public to grow intol-
erant of striking government employees. Congress responded to this
public sentiment by explicitly prohibiting strikes by federal employees
in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.27 A week-long strike by 2,400
schoolteachers in Buffalo finally triggered the New York State Legis-
lature to enact its own tough anti-strike statute, the Condon-Wadlin
Act.28 In his memorandum of approval for the bill, Governor Dewey
wrote: "[e]very liberty enjoyed in this Nation exists because it is pro-
tected by Government which functions uninterruptedly .... A strike
20. Id. § 151.
21. Private employees have the right to engage in concerted activities, while
"[p]rivate employers have countervailing rights: they may lock out their employees or go
out of business entirely .... [These] opposing economic pressures ... exert reciprocal
pressures upon the parties to modify their position ... to bring about a private agree-
ment." LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 49.
22. The NLRB has rulemaking, prosecutorial and, in the five member "Board," adju-
dicatory authority. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988).
23. DONOVAN, supra note 10, at 1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. In early 1946, the New York City Transport Worker's Union threatened to strike
if the city proceeded with the sale of power plants that supplied power to the city's rail
system. Later that year, Rochester city employees engaged in a strike which resulted in a
dismissal of 489 workers. Approximately 30,000 organized workers joined in solidarity
to support the discharged workers. The strike resulted in Governor Dewey intervening
to settle the dispute. Id. at 2-3.
27. C.120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988)).
28. LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 8; DONOVAN, supra note 10, at 3.
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against government would be successful only if it could produce pa-
ralysis of government. This no people can permit and survive. '29
The purpose of the Condon-Wadlin Act was to prevent public em-
ployee strikes by mandating severe penalties.30 Although the Con-
don-Wadlin Act remained in force for twenty years, its penalties
proved difficult to enforce and were rarely invoked.31
In the early 1960's, several attempts were made to amend or repeal
the Condon-Wadlin Act. 2 In 1965, critics of the statute blamed the
severity of its penalties as the primary obstacle to the settlement of the
welfare workers' strike in New York City, the longest strike in the
City's history.33 In 1963, Governor Nelson Rockefeller promised to
appoint a committee to "make an intensive study and recommenda-
tions for improving personnel policies and practices in the public ser-
vices."' 34  But it took a devastating strike by the New York City
Transport Workers Union in 1966 a3 before Governor Rockefeller fi-
nally formed the Taylor Committee. 6
The Taylor Committee's function was "to make legislative propos-
als for protecting the public against the disruption of vital public ser-
vices by illegal strikes, while at the same time protecting the rights of
public employees."' 37 It recommended that:
the Condon-Wadlin Act should be repealed and replaced by a stat-
ute which . . . would (a) grant to public employees the right of
organization and representation, (b) empower the state, local gov-
ernments and other political subdivisions to recognize, negotiate
29. DONOVAN, supra note 10, at 5 (citations omitted).
30. The penalties included: termination of employment or reinstatement upon the
condition that the employee not receive any increase in compensation for three years and
remain on probation for five years. Id. at 6.
31. LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 8-9; DONOVAN, supra note 10, at 5-6.
32. A temporary amendment was enacted in 1963, reducing the penalties to a more
realistic level. LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 9; DONOVAN, supra note 10, at 6-8.
33. The entire welfare program in New York City was affected for several weeks.
LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 10.
34. DONOVAN, supra note 10, at 11 (citations omitted).
35. The Transport Workers commenced the strike on January 1st, paralyzing public
transportation in the city for 12 days, at a loss of approximately $100 million a day.
LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 11; DONOVAN, supra note 10, at 18-20. For more infor-
mation regarding the strike, see Weinstein v. New York City Transit Auth., 267
N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
36. Governor Rockefeller's committee consisted of five collective bargaining experts:
George W. Taylor of the University of Pennsylvania, Chair; David L. Cole of Patterson,
New Jersey; John T. Dunlop of Harvard; E. Wight Bakke of Yale; and Frederick H.
Harbison of Princeton. LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 11; DONOVAN, supra note 10, at
24-25.
37. DONOVAN, supra note 10, at 23 (citing NEW YORK STATE GOVERNOR'S COM-
MITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, Final Report 9 (1966)).
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with and enter into written agreements with employee organiza-
tions representing public employees, (c) create a Public Employ-
ment Relations Board to assist in resolving disputes between public
employees and public employers and (d) continue the prohibition
against strikes by public employees and provide remedies for viola-
tions of such prohibition. 8
As the legislative history makes clear, the Taylor Law was intended
to promote "harmonious and cooperative relationships between gov-
ernment and its employees" 39 while at the same time preventing inter-
ruption of public services by prohibiting employee strikes. Moreover,
the Taylor Committee recognized that a necessary concomitant to
protecting the public from public service strikes' was to insure "other
ways and means for dealing with claims of public employees for equi-
table treatment."4 1 In short, the Committee saw fundamental distinc-
tions between private and public employment42 that necessitated a
wholly independent statutory scheme informed by such distinctions.
43
These "fundamental distinctions" between private and public em-
ployment have been variously identified." They can be summarized
briefly. First, unlike private sector employment, where the terms and
conditions of employment are influenced by market forces, "terms
and conditions of [public] employment are decided through a process
responsive to majority will."'4 5 Government workers are then vulner-
able to the voting public whose economic interests, "both as taxpayers
and as users of public services, run directly counter to the economic
interests of public employees." 46 For these and like reasons, it is espe-
cially critical to public employees that there be some mechanism to
ensure that their interests receive adequate consideration in the polit-
ical process.4
Second, the legal and practical restrictions on the authority of gov-
ernment agencies to negotiate with their employees similarly distin-
guish public employment, especially at the collective bargaining
38. Id.; see generally LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 39.
39. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1983).
40. Report from the Taylor Committee to Governor Rockefeller, reprinted in LEFKO-
WITZ, supra note 10, at 45.
41. Id.
42. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-a(4) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993).
43. See generally LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 43-85.
44. See generally LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 41-85; Clyde W. Summers, Public
Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974).
45. Summers, supra note 44, at 1160; see also LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 51.




table." For example, public employees, like other interest groups in
the political process, are competing for funds within limited budgets
which the employing agencies cannot exceed.49 Hence, the public em-
ployees' budget share depends upon their ability to bargain in compe-
tition with the other interest groups.5° This competition in the
political arena, unknown or only indirectly present in the private sec-
tor, is a fact of public sector labor life. It places unique difficulties
upon the government workers' bargaining representative in pressing
for an optimum agreement. Such peculiarities of public sector collec-
tive bargaining surely ought not be disregarded when courts interpret
the Taylor Law.
Finally, and perhaps most crucial, public employees are barred
from engaging in strikes.5 To be sure, this significantly reduces bar-
gaining power. The Taylor Committee noted that in the private sec-
tor, the employer and the employee exert "reciprocal pressures" 52 to
reach a modified collective bargaining agreement. Because of the ab-
sence of similar pressures in the public sector, the Committee con-
cluded that "effective collective negotiation in the public service...
cannot be achieved by transferring collective bargaining as practiced
in the private sector into the governmental sector. New procedures
have to be created."53
Fully cognizant of the significance of the foregoing, the Taylor
Committee and, ultimately, the New York State Legislature, at-
tempted to fashion a statutory scheme that reflected the unique fea-
tures of public sector labor. As explicitly provided in the Taylor Law,
48. LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 50.
49. See generally Summers, supra note 44.
50. Id. at 1163-64.
51. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 200, 210 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993) (expressly
prohibiting strikes and providing that employees determined to have violated these provi-
sions shall be subject to either removal, disciplinary action or payroll deductions); see also
DONOVAN, supra note 10, at 207.
52. LEFKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 49; see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
53. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). The Taylor Committee's suggestions for collective
negotiations in the public sector were primarily codified in section 209 of the Civil Service
Law. N.Y. CIv. SERV LAW § 209 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993). The most notable
recommendations are that: (1) collective negotiations be "closely coordinated with the
budget and legislative year;" (2) all written agreements include procedures which both
the governmental agency and the public employees mutually agreed upon to invoke in the
case of an impasse; (3) if an impasse cannot be resolved, PERB should appoint a fact-
finding board to make recommendations; and (4) if the fact-finding recommendations are
rejected by either the governmental agency or the public employees, the "appropriate
legislative body or committee" should conduct a public hearing "at which the parties
review their positions with respect to the recommendations of the fact-finding board prior
to final legislative action on the budget or other enactment." Id. at 67-68. For more
general information regarding these recommendations, see id. at 62-68.
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no federal or state law "applicable wholly or in part to private em-
ployment ' 4 should have binding or controlling precedential value.55
III. Supreme Court Development of the Duty of Fair
Representation
A. Pre-Vaca Case Law
In the seminal case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,56
the Supreme Court recognized a duty on the part of exclusive collec-
tive bargaining agents to act on behalf of all the employees in the
bargaining unit, nonmembers as well as members, blacks as well as
whites. In Steele, the bargaining representative of a unit of railroad
firemen excluded blacks from its membership. The union negotiated
an agreement with several railroads that would ultimately eliminate
all blacks from railroad service. The Court upheld the complaint of
the black firemen alleging breach of the union's duty to exercise its
authority as exclusive representative without hostile discrimination."
Inferring such an equal or fair representation duty from the Rail-
way Labor Act,58 under which the case arose, the Court said:
[T]he organization chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its
members, the majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for
and not against those whom it represents .... We think that the
Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative of a
craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of
the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legis-
lature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it
legislates.... [T]he aim of Congress [was] to impose on the bar-
gaining representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to
exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for
whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them. 9
The Court elaborated that the exclusive representative is not barred
from making contracts that treat employees differently on the basis of
relevant considerations, such as seniority, competence and skill. But
discrimination not based on such relevant considerations are forbid-
den, the Court added, and "discriminations based on race alone are
obviously irrelevant and invidious."' Explaining that fair representa-
54. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-a(4) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993).
55. Id.
56. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
57. Id. at 203.
58. C. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1988)).
59. Steele, 323 U.S. at 202-03.
60. Id. at 203.
[V:ol. XX
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tion is an essential condition of exclusive representation, the Court
summed up the rule as follows:
So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory representa-
tive of a craft, it can not rightly refuse to perform the duty, which
is inseparable from the power of representation conferred upon it,
to represent the entire membership of the craft ... without hostile
discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.6
In Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,62
a companion case to Steele also involving the Railway Labor Act and
racial discrimination, the Court declared the union duty of fair repre-
sentation to be "a federal right implied from the statute and the policy
which it has adopted."63 In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,6M decided the
same day as Steele and Tunstall, the Court extended the duty of fair
representation - at least implicitly - to the NLRA in a case not
involving racial discrimination. In Wallace, the Court upheld an
NLRB order nullifying a union shop contract that resulted in the dis-
charge of employees who had been members of a rival union. The
Court, applying the reasoning of Steele, ruled that the exclusive bar-
gaining representative under the NLRA acts on behalf of all the em-
ployees, not just its members, and thus is "charged with the
responsibility of representing their interests fairly and impartially. 65
Nine years later, in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,66 the Court made
explicit what was implied in Wallace. The duty of fair representation,
as set forth in Steele and Tunstall, is indeed essential to the NLRA's
scheme of majority rule through an exclusive bargaining agent, just as
it is to the comparable scheme under the Railway Labor Act. "The
statutory obligation [of bargaining representatives] to represent all
members of an appropriate unit," the Court stated, "requires them to
make an honest effort to serve the interests of all of those members,
without hostility to any."'67
In Huffman, the union entered into an agreement providing senior-
ity credit for pre-employment military service - a benefit not covered
by the federal statute already requiring seniority credit for military
service that interrupted employment. A group of unfavorably affected
employees, nonveterans as well as veterans with post-employment mil-
61. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
62. 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
63. Id. at 213.
64. 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
65. Wallace, 323 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added).
66. 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
67. Id. at 337.
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itary service, challenged the contractual provision as discriminatory
and hostile to their seniority interests. The Court, insisting that the
union "is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of
all whom it represents,"6 nevertheless upheld the seniority provision
as wholly consistent with the public policy and fairness of allowing
credit for time spent in the armed forces.69 Then, explaining that not
all differential treatment of employees is impermissible, the Court
elaborated on the parameters of the duty of fair representation:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the
terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and
classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does
not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are
represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonable-
ness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serv-
ing the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and
honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.7"
Four years after Huffman, in the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson,7
the Supreme Court extended the duty of fair representation beyond
the negotiation stages of collective bargaining. The Court sustained
the cause of action of wrongfully discharged black railroad employees
who complained that the union had refused to process their griev-
ances on account of race. Holding that a bargaining representative's
responsibility applies to daily contract adjustments, problem solving
and worker-rights protection, as well as to contract negotiation, the
Court explained the continuing nature of the duty of fair
representation:
The bargaining representative's duty not to draw "irrelevant and
invidious" distinctions among those it represents does not come to
an abrupt end.., with the making of an agreement between union
and employer. Collective bargaining is a continuous process.... A
contract may be fair and impartial on its face yet administered in
such a way, with the active or tacit consent of the union, as to be
flagrantly discriminatory against some members of the bargaining
unit.7
2
In its 1964 decision in Humphrey v. Moore,73 the Court returned to
issues of seniority and resulting differential treatment, and upheld the
68. Id. at 338.
69. Id. at 340.
70. Id. at 338 (emphasis added).
71. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
72. Id. at 46 (citations omitted).
73. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
[Vol. XX
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union's action based on what the Court deemed to be "wholly rele-
vant considerations, not upon capricious or arbitrary factors."74 In
Humphrey, two trucking companies whose employees were repre-
sented by the same union were merged. The union agreed to dovetail
the seniority lists of the two companies; consequently, the employees
of the younger company lost seniority. The Supreme Court, relying
on its two prior duty of fair representation cases under the NLRA,
Wallace and Huffman, found that the union acted "honestly, in good
faith and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination," and thus de-
ferred to the union's "wide range of reasonableness ... in the exercise
of its discretion.17
5
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that the duty of fair
representation was incompatible with representing employees having
somewhat conflicting interests:
[W]e are not ready to find a breach of the collective bargaining
agent's duty of fair representation in taking a good faith position
contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents nor in sup-
porting the position of one group of employees against that of an-
other .... Conflict between employees represented by the same
union is a recurring fact. To remove or gag the union in these
cases would surely weaken the collective bargaining and grievance
processes.76
Three years later, in Vaca v. Sipes,77 the Court articulated the now-
standard three-prong formulation: "A breach of the statutory duty of
fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith. 'T In Vaca, an employee filed a grievance against the
employer after being discharged for poor health in alleged violation of
the collective bargaining agreement. The union, however, chose not
to take the grievance to arbitration, because it failed to obtain medical
evidence favorable to the employee. The Supreme Court, finding no
evidence of any personal hostility toward the employee, nor evidence
of anything other than good faith on the part of the union, held that
the duty of fair representation was not breached regardless of the mer-
its of the employee's grievance. 79 As the Court explained:
[I]f a union's decision that a particular grievance lacked sufficient
74. Id. at 350.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 349-50.
77. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
78. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 194-95.
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merit to justify arbitration would constitute a breach of the duty of
fair representation because a judge or jury later found the griev-
ance meritorious, the union's incentive to settle such grievances
short of arbitration would be seriously reduced. The dampening
effect on the entire grievance procedure of this reduction of the
union's freedom to settle claims in good faith would surely be
substantial.8s
Thus, the Court concluded, an individual employee does not have
an absolute right to have his grievance pursued by the union," as long
as the union has made its decision "in good faith and in a non-arbi-
trary manner. '8 2 Nevertheless, the Court did reaffirm the fundamen-
tal purpose of the duty of fair representation to serve as a "bulwark to
prevent arbitrary union conduct."' s3 Indeed, the Court perhaps went
further in reinforcing that "bulwark" than it had before. It explicitly
"accept[ed] the proposition" not only that a "union may not arbitrar-
ily ignore a meritorious grievance," but also that a union violates the
duty of fair representation if it processes a grievance "in perfunctory
fashion." 4
In fact, the Court volunteered that the union in Vaca "might well
have breached its duty.., had it processed the grievance in a perfunc-
tory manner." 5 In sum, while the Court made clear that bargaining
representatives must be accorded a wide range of discretion, and that
the duty of fair representation precludes only arbitrary, discrimina-
tory and bad faith union conduct, the Court evidently approved the
notion that a mere "perfunctory" exercise of the union's discretion
would constitute a violation of that standard.
B. Post-Vaca Case Law
Having thus seemingly lowered the threshold for a duty of fair rep-
resentation violation, the Court appeared to raise it again, and sub-
stantially so, a few years later in its 1971 decision in Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge.s6 There the Court, in the course of deciding
that punitive damages were unavailable for a breach of the duty of fair
representation, held that "[t]here must be 'substantial evidence of
fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct' ",87 to prove such a
80. Id. at 192-93.
81. Id. at 191.
82. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 194.
83. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 194.
86. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).




The Lockridge standard has, at least impliedly, been rescinded by
the Court in subsequent opinions. In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc. ,88 the Vaca standard was revived, and in fact, the Court applied
the pro-employee "perfunctory" test.s9 In the course of ruling that an
arbitration award can be vacated if a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation is shown, 90 the Court strongly suggested that a "knowingly"
or even "negligently" inadequate investigation of an employee's griev-
ance would constitute impermissible union conduct.91 Neither
Lockridge nor its formulation were mentioned in Hines. Likewise,
Lockridge was ignored in the Court's subsequent discussions of the
duty of fair representation criteria.92 Moreover, the "perfunctory"
test - absent any indication of Lockridge's required fraud, deceit or
dishonesty - provided the sole basis in several later cases for sus-
taining charges of breach of the duty of fair representation.
93
But the precise contours of the "perfunctory" test were anything
but certain. If fraudulent, deceitful or dishonest union conduct was
unnecessary to establish a charge of unfair representation, was simple
negligence sufficient? In its 1990 decision in United Steelworkers of
America v. Rawson,94 the Supreme Court answered with a resolute
"no."
In Rawson, the union was sued for breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation for its allegedly negligent performance of mine-safety activi-
ties undertaken pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The
Court, restating the Vaca requirement of arbitrary, discriminatory or
bad faith conduct, held that "mere negligence, even in the enforce-
ment of a collective-bargaining agreement, [does] not state a claim for
breach of the duty of fair representation .... 91
The Court did not attempt to apply the "perfunctory" test - previ-
ously applied to processing employee grievances - to the activities at
issue in Rawson. In fact, the notion that the union might have "per-
functorily" attended to mine-safety was, apparently, entirely irrele-
vant. According to the Court, absent some specific contractually-
88. 424 U.S. 554 (1975).
89. Id. at 568-69.
90. Id. at 569-71.
91. Id. at 569.
92. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990); Electrical
Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
93. See, e.g., Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212 (1983); Foust, 442
U.S. at 47.
94. 495 U.S. 362 (1990).
95. Id. at 372-73.
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created obligation, 'duty of care is simply no part of the union's duty
of fair representation. The Court explained:
The doctrine of fair representation is an important check on the
arbitrary exercise of union power, but it is a purposefully limited
check, for a "wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statu-
tory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents." If
an employee claims that a union owes him a more far-reaching
duty, he must be able to point to language in the collective-bargain-
ing agreement specifically indicating an intent to create obligations
enforceable against the union by the individual employees.9 6
Finally, in the 1991 decision in Airline Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill,97 a
unanimous Supreme Court effectively raised even higher the thresh-
old for finding unfair representation. While the Court in Rawson re-
jected negligence as a basis for a duty of fair representation violation,
in O'Neill it reaffirmed Vaca and rejected anything short of wholly
irrational or invidiously discriminatory conduct.98
In O'Neill, a bitter dispute between an airline and the union repre-
senting its pilots was resolved when the union agreed, inter alia, to
end the strike, to settle all pending litigation and to accept a realloca-
tion of positions between working pilots and returning strikers. For-
mer striking pilots charged the union with unfair representation for
negotiating an agreement that, in their view, arbitrarily discriminated
against them. In denying the pilots' claim, the Court, at the outset,
held that the "rule announced in Vaca ... applies to all union activ-
ity, including contract negotiation." 99 But, under that rule - prohib-
iting arbitrary, discriminatory and bad faith conduct - the union did
not breach its duty of fair representation.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had refused to dismiss
the duty of fair representation claim, holding that the union's conduct
might well have been "arbitrary." The court relied on the fact that
the negotiated agreement left the striking pilots in a worse position
than if they had unconditionally surrendered and unilaterally ended
the strike - at least then, said the appeals court, the strikers would
have been entitled to complete priority on all the positions in ques-
tion."° But the Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's "refine-
ment of the arbitrariness component" because it invited too much
judicial review:
96. Id. at 374 (citations omitted).
97. 111 S. Ct. 1127 (1991).
98. Id. at 1136-37.
99. Id. at 1130 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 1132.
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Congress did not intend judicial review of a union's performance to
permit the court to substitute its own view of the proper bargain
for that reached by the union. Rather, Congress envisioned the
relationship between the courts and labor unions as similar to that
between the courts and the legislature. Any substantive examina-
tion of a union's performance, therefore, must be highly deferen-
tial, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators need for the
effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities.' °1
Hence, continued the Court, the bargaining agreement negotiated
by the union could amount to a duty of fair representation violation
only if "so far outside a 'wide range of reasonableness,' that it is wholly
'irrational' or 'arbitrary.' "102 Even a bad settlement - one worse
than a unilateral termination of the strike - would not meet that test,
the Court stated.0 3 The "strong policy favoring the peaceful settle-
ment of labor disputes" must be considered, explained the Court, as
well as the "facts and the legal climate" confronting the negotiators
when an agreement is reached."° The settlement reached by the
union in O'Neill assured prompt access to at least some of the pilot
positions, and the costs and risks of litigation were avoided. 0 5 Nor
did the agreed-upon reallocation of positions constitute impermissible
discrimination against the striking pilots. The duty of fair representa-
tion, the Court concluded, only bars "invidious 'discrimination,' " not
a "rational compromise." 106
Though the Court in O'Neill did not return to the Lockridge stan-
dard requiring fraud, deceit or dishonesty, it nonetheless did - even
more so than in Rawson - significantly increase the difficulty of prov-
ing unfair representation. It thereby effectively diluted the duty owed
to employees by their exclusive agents. While ostensibly applying the
now-quarter century old Vaca standard, the Court in fact did some
not insubstantial recasting of the duty of fair representation. For-
merly, an exclusive bargaining representative was responsible to avoid
all arbitrary, discriminatory and bad faith conduct, even "perfunc-
tory" conduct.0 7 Under the Court's most recent decisions, especially
O'Neill, that responsibility has been reduced to no more than an obli-
gation to avoid wholly irrational and invidious behavior. That stan-
dard is surely a far cry from Huffman's requirement of "complete
101. Id. at 1135 (emphasis added).
102. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. at 1136 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1137.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967).
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good faith,"10 and it hardly resembles the "bulwark" against unfair
union behavior that the duty of fair representation was intended to
be. 109
IV. New York's Development of the Duty of Fair Representation
Under the Taylor Law
Whatever the Supreme Court's standard currently might be, the
basic concept of the duty of fair representation that developed in fed-
eral case law has become an integral part of New York's Taylor Law.
As a matter of state case law - and since 1990, a matter of state
legislative mandate 110 - public employee unions covered by the Tay-
lor Law are obligated to unit employees in much the same way as are
private employee unions under federal labor law.
The precise contours of that obligation under the Taylor Law are
not spelled out in the case law and are not even intimated in the new
statutory provision. Though the duty of fair representation is a set-
tled part of the Taylor Law, it is not entirely clear how closely that
duty conforms to the established federal standards. Nor is it clear
whether the duty of fair representation under the Taylor Law has a
life of its own or simply follows wherever the Supreme Court leads.
What is clear, however, is that Taylor Law duty of fair representation
was derived directly from Supreme Court decisions, and little consid-
eration has been given by the New York courts to possible differences.
PERB, the administrative adjudicatory authority under New
York's statute,"' has over the last twenty-five years articulated crite-
ria for determining whether public employees have been fairly repre-
sented for purposes of the Taylor Law. 12 The state courts, however,
have not been receptive. PERB's criteria have not been definitively
rejected by the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court.1 3 But
neither have they - nor any other criteria providing meaningful em-
ployee protection - been endorsed. Hence, while the existence of a
duty of fair representation under the Taylor Law is now beyond dis-
pute, review of the administrative and judicial decisions reveals that
-except perhaps in some PERB adjudications - the contours and
substance of that duty under the state statute remain ill-defined.
108. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
109. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182.
110. See N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-a(2)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
111. See N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 205 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993).
112. See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.




Within a few years of the Taylor Law's enactment in 1967, the duty
of fair representation was presumed in administrative adjudications.
In 1971, in In re United Federation of Teachers, Local 2,114 the Vaca
standard was applied to dismiss an improper practice charge claiming
that the union wrongfully refused to process an employee grievance.
The union had satisfied its obligation to the employee, the hearing
officer held, when it "considered the merits" of the grievance and
"made an informed and not unreasonable judgment not to process
it."115
A few years later, in In re Professional Staff Congress of CUNY,1 6
the hearing officer noted that PERB had not yet "had occasion to
define the requirements (or, indeed, even the existence) of the duty of
'fair representation.' "17 Without citation to any state or federal de-
cisional law, the hearing officer noted that a breach of that duty would
seem to require "discrimination based on lack of union membership
or 'arbitrary or invidious treatment' of a specific group of mem-
bers. " 8 There being no evidence of such union misconduct, the im-
proper practice charge was dismissed.
That same year, 1974, in In re Plainview-Old Bethpage Central
School District,19 PERB explicitly recognized the duty of fair repre-
sentation under the Taylor Law. Finding no factual merit to a charge
that certain employees received lower raises because of their nonmem-
bership in the union, the Board proceeded to add that:
the collective negotiating representative of public employees has a
duty to represent all of the employees in the negotiating unit fairly
and impartially. It would be a breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion if an employee organization were to discriminate against em-
ployees because such employees were not members .... In the
instant case, [the wage agreement was] not the result of some invid-
ious motive on the part of [the union] or the employer. Rather, as
it appears from the evidence in the record, it was a result achieved
in good faith negotiations. 2 °
In its 1977 decision in In re Brighton Transportation Ass'n, 121
PERB held that the union's "casual" decision not to process an em-
114. 4 P.E.R.B. 4650 (1971).
115. Id. at 4653.
116. 7 P.E.R.B. 4591 (1974).
117. Id. at 4592.
118. Id.
119. 7 P.E.R.B. 3096 (1974).
120. Id. at 3096-97.
121. 10 P.E.R.B. 3154 (1977).
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ployee grievance did not amount to a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. Applying the language it had used three years earlier in
Plainview-Old Bethpage School District,2 2 PERB explained that the
union was obligated to administer grievances "fairly, impartially and
in good faith."'' 23  But now, in dismissing the employee's charge,
PERB relied on the lack of proof that the union's conduct was "im-
properly motivated or so negligent or irresponsible" as to constitute a
violation of the duty of fair representation. 24
Several months later, in In re Nassau Educational Chapter,'25
PERB applied the criteria it had relied upon in Brighton Transporta-
tion Ass'n to uphold a charge of unfair representation. Elaborating on
those criteria, PERB explained: "the obligation [of fair representa-
tion] is violated when an employee organization, either by reason of
improper motives or of grossly negligent or irresponsible conduct, has
failed to consider or evaluate a grievance complaint presented to
it."126
Having thus defined a duty of fair representation violation, PERB
had little difficulty concluding that one had been committed where
the union failed to process, or even evaluate, a wrongful discharge
grievance for thirteen months, during which time the union misled
the employee into believing that the grievance was being attended.
PERB found that the "utter lack of serious attention and response" to
the grievance for such an extended period "manifested grossly irre-
sponsible conduct" in violation of the duty of fair representation.' 27
In later cases, the Nassau Educational Chapter test was reaffirmed re-
peatedly; it soon became settled PERB doctrine. 21
B. Judicial Decisions
In 1976, two years after PERB explicitly recognized the duty of fair
representation under the Taylor Law in Plainview-Old Bethpage
School District,29 a state appellate court, in Jackson v. Regional
122. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
123. 10 P.E.R.B. at 3154 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 3155 (emphasis added).
125. 11 P.E.R.B. 3019 (1978).
126. Id. at 3020 (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., In re Professional Firefighters Ass'n (Bidgham), 23 P.E.R.B. 3021
(1990); In re CSEA (Adams), 22 P.E.R.B. 7518 (1989); In re Public Employees Federa-
tion (St. George), 18 P.E.R.B. 3005 (1985); In re Elmira Teachers Ass'n, NYSUT, 13
P.E.R.B. 3113 (1980); In re Auburn Administrators Ass'n, 11 P.E.R.B. 4563, aff'd, 11
P.E.R.B. 3141 (1978); In re East Ramapo Teacher's Ass'n, 11 P.E.R.B. 3066 (1978).
129. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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Transit Service,13° held that the Supreme Court's Vaca standard was
fully applicable to public employee unions under the statute. While
acknowledging that federal decisions governing private employment
do not control the state's public sector labor law, the Fourth Depart-
ment ruled that "the public employee union has the same duty of fair
representation as the private employee union.""'' To afford the union
"unfettered discretion" and thereby to leave employees without some
protection against "wrongful or perfunctory union conduct," the court
explained, would be "contrary to the public policy relating to public
as well as private sectors of employment."' 32 Hence, the court in
Jackson found that the union had violated the duty of fair representa-
tion by its failure, without reason, to process an employee's grievance
in the manner required by the collective bargaining agreement.
The Jackson decision seemed to equate mere negligence in process-
ing an employee grievance with a violation of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. 133 Though that proposition has since been rejected under
federal law,' 34 and arguably under state law as well, 35 Jackson's une-
quivocal incorporation of the duty of fair representation into the Tay-
lor Law was never seriously questioned by the courts of New York
thereafter. 3 6
Nevertheless, in the 1981 decision in Albino v. City of New York, 37
it could still be said - as the Second Department did say in that case
- that the application of the duty of fair representation to the four-
teen year old Taylor Law had not yet been definitively decided by the
Court of Appeals. Lower tribunals throughout the state could, there-
fore, only assume that it applied.' 3 Three years later, the decision of
New York's highest court in Civil Service Bar Ass'n v. City of New
York "I seemed to settle the issue.
In Civil Service Bar Ass'n, the union agreed to a negotiated settle-
ment that was less favorable to some employees than the arbitration
award the union had originally obtained in the grievance process. A
130. 388 N.Y.S.2d 441 (App. Div., 4th Dept. 1976).
131. Id. at 443.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 442.
134. See Rawson, 495 U.S. at 372-73; see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Civil Service Bar Ass'n v. City of New York, 474 N.E.2d 587, 590-91
(N.Y. 1984); Nikiel v. City of Buffalo, 429 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (App. Div., 4th Dept.
1980); Jacobs v. Board of Educ., 409 N.Y.S.2d 234, 236-38 (App. Div., 2d Dept. 1978);
De Cherro v. CSEA, 400 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (App. Div., 3d Dept. 1977).
137. 438 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div., 2d Dept. 1981).
138. Id. at 592.
139. 474 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 1984).
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group of employees sought vacatur of the settlement on the ground
that the union had not fairly represented their interests. The Court of
Appeals, rejecting the claim of unfair representation, left little doubt
that the duty of fair representation applied to the Taylor Law, and
that the Vaca standards governed. The first sentence of the court's
decision was direct: "[a] union does not violate its duty of fair repre-
sentation when it settles an appeal from an order confirming an arbi-
tration award ... in the absence of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad
faith conduct by the union."'"
Reviewing the development of the duty of fair representation in the
United States Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals re-
peated the Vaca standard and noted that "the courts in New York
have recognized a similar duty of fair representation on the part of
public sector unions predicated on their role as exclusive bargaining
representatives."141
Without adding that it was now recognizing that duty as well, the
Court of Appeals nevertheless appeared clearly to be doing so. "The
union did not violate its duty of fair representation in the circum-
stances of this case," the court concluded, not because there was no
such duty under the Taylor Law, but because the union had acted
honestly and in good faith in "balancing the divergent interests of its
membership."' 4 2 Indeed, the Court of Appeals has since cited Civil
Service Bar Ass'n for the proposition that the Taylor Law scheme of
exclusive bargaining agents - like the corresponding scheme of the
NLRA - necessarily implies a duty of fair representation. 143 More-
over, since that decision, the existence of the duty of fair representa-
tion has been treated by the Court of Appeals as settled. 1'
In the eight years that separated Jackson and Civil Service Bar
Ass'n, PERB had been applying the duty of fair representation as an
essential component of the Taylor Law scheme.' 45 It was during that
time, in Brighton Transportation Ass'n and Nassau Educational Chap-
ter, that PERB had developed a standard which, though akin to that
set forth in Vaca, was articulated in meaningfully different terms. Lit-
140. Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added).
143. See Baker v. Board of Educ., 514 N.E.2d 1109, 1112 (N.Y. 1987) (citing Civil
Service Bar Ass'n, 474 N.E.2d at 590-91).
144. See, e.g., Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. PERB (Diaz), 533 N.E.2d 1051 (N.Y.
1988) [hereinafter Diaz]; Smith v. Sipe, 493 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1986). In any event, any
lingering doubts were eliminated with the enactment of the 1990 amendment to the Tay-
lor Law. See supra notes 7, 110 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
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tie definitive guidance, however, has yet to issue from the state's
courts. The three-prong Vaca standard applied in Civil Service Bar
Ass'n has been restated verbatim in many recent Appellate Division
decisions, 46 but there has been little elaboration of its meaning in
those decisions, and none at all in the decisions of the Court of
Appeals.
Two recent cases did present New York's highest court with an
opportunity to elucidate the contours of the duty of fair representa-
tion under the Taylor Law. But in Smith v. Sipe, 4 " the court summa-
rily adopted the dissenting opinion of the Appellate Division, and left
unspecified what alternative line of reasoning in that opinion it agreed
with. In Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. PERB (Diaz),48 the court
avoided a pressing issue passed upon below by both PERB and the
Appellate Division, by refusing to address the issue on a procedural
technicality.
In Smith, an employee lost his position when he followed the erro-
neous advice of the union president. The significant issue implicated
was whether mere negligence could constitute a violation of the duty
of fair representation under the Taylor Law. But the divided Third
Department panel decided the case without answering that question.
In upholding the employee's complaint, the court construed the alle-
gations as claiming more than mere negligence.149 The dissent did not
answer the question either - at least not unequivocally. Instead, it
concluded that the particular negligence involved in the case did not
violate the duty of fair representation, even though "negligent con-
duct" of a "more significant" nature might.1 50
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's finding of a
breach of the duty of fair representation by simply adopting the "rea-
sons stated" in the dissent. 5 ' But the "reasons stated" in the dissent
were fairly subject to different interpretations about the penultimate
issue of mere negligence. All that can be derived from the dissent and
its adoption by the Court of Appeals is that, under the Taylor Law,
negligent conduct does not necessarily constitute a duty of fair repre-
sentation violation - but it might.
146. See, e.g., Braatz v. Mathison, 581 N.Y.S.2d 112 (App. Div., 3d Dept. 1992); Trai-
nosky v. CSEA, 514 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App. Div., 3d Dept. 1987); Symanski v. East Ramapo
Central School District, 502 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div., 2d Dept. 1986).
147. 493 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1986), rev'g 487 N.Y.S.2d 153 (App. Div., 3d Dept. 1985).
148. 533 N.E.2d 1051 (N.Y. 1988), aff'g on. other grounds, 522 N.Y.S.2d 709 (App.
Div., 3d Dept. 1987).
149. Smith, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
150. Id. at 156.
151. Smith, 493 N.E.2d at 238.
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In its 1988 decision in Diaz, the Court of Appeals declined to ad-
dress the issue of whether a union's gross negligence can violate the
duty of fair representation. According to the court, the precise issue
resolved by PERB and the Appellate Division was not specifically
raised by the employee before the hearing officer, and therefore, it was
waived. 152
The grievance filed by the employee in Diaz had been dismissed
because of a series of mistakes and omissions by the union's grievance
representative. PERB found that the union was grossly negligent in
training the representative and, thus, had breached its duty of fair
representation. The Third Department annulled PERB's determina-
tion. It rejected PERB's rule that a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation may be based on "irresponsible or grossly negligent" union
conduct. "There must be a showing," the Appellate Division held,
that the union's activity or omission "was deliberately invidious, arbi-
trary or founded in bad faith.' I 3 The Court of Appeals' avoidance of
that issue - addressed both by PERB and the Appellate Division -
leaves unsettled the validity of PERB's Nassau Educational Chapter
standard, which held that grossly negligent union conduct is sufficient
under the Taylor Law to support a charge of unfair representation.
C. Summary
Fifteen years ago, Benjamin Aaron labelled Supreme Court criteria
for breach of the duty of fair representation "impenetrable ambigu-
ity."' 54 Today, there is little to penetrate. Recent Supreme Court de-
cisions have not eliminated all confusion, but they appear to have
eliminated most of the substance of the duty of fair representation.
Only the most egregious union conduct - wholly irrational or invidi-
ously discriminatory - is prohibited.
Previously deemed an essential guarantee to workers that they
would be represented "fairly," viz. "impartially,"'' 55 in "complete
good faith,"' 15 6 and not "in perfunctory fashion," 1 7 the duty of fair
representation has been transformed into a mandate that courts be
"highly deferential"' 58 to bargaining agents - the very ones whose
conduct the duty was intended to regulate. While the Supreme Court
152. Diaz, 533 N.E.2d at 1052.
153. Diaz, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 710-11.
154. Benjamin Aaron, The Duty of Fair Representation: An Overview, in THE CHANG-
ING LAW OF FAIR REPRESENTATION, supra note 6.
155. Steele, 323 U.S. at 204.
156. Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338.
157. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191.
158. O'Neill, Ill S. Ct. at 1135.
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is ostensibly still applying the Vaca standard, it can hardly be dis-
puted that the Court's recent interpretation and application of that
standard has diluted employee protection from arbitrary treatment.
The status of the duty of fair representation under the Taylor Law
is not much better. The Court of Appeals has said very little, except
that the duty exists and that it is "similar" to what is spelled out in
Vaca.'5 9 Without meaningful guidance from above, New York's
lower courts have, not surprisingly, been reduced to reflexive recita-
tion of Vaca's three prongs. Only PERB seems willing and able to
take the duty of fair representation seriously. Only PERB, with its
"improperly motivated" or "grossly negligent or irresponsible" stan-
dard,"6 has given the duty of fair representation shape and force
under the Taylor Law. And yet, as in Diaz, its efforts have been frus-
trated or, as in most judicial opinions on the subject, simply been
ignored.
IV. Conclusion: A Call For Independence
This twenty-fifth anniversary of the Taylor Law seems a most ap-
propriate time for an independent reconsideration of the duty of fair
representation - independent of Supreme Court analysis and more
attuned to the history, policies, and purposes of public sector labor
relations in New York. Indeed, in CSEA v. Helsby,1 6' its first decision
on the Taylor Law, the Court of Appeals stressed that the new statute
could not be analogized too closely to federal law governing private
sector labor. 16 2 And the court has, even in recent decisions, continued
to insist that the Taylor Law and the NLRA reflect some fundamen-
tally different concerns which must be considered when construing
the state's statute. 163
The Taylor Law itself explicitly provides that "the fundamental dis-
tinctions between private and public employment shall be recognized,
and no body of federal or state law applicable wholly or in part to
private employment, shall be regarded as binding or controlling pre-
cedent."" Moreover, the Taylor Law explicitly reflects New York
State's policies "to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships
between government and its employees and to protect the public by
159. Civil Service Bar Ass'n, 474 N.E.2d at 590-91.
160. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
161. 236 N.E.2d 481 (N.Y. 1968).
162. Id. at 482-83.
163. See, e.g., Rosen v. PERB, 526 N.E.2d 25, 28-30 (N.Y. 1988); Baker v. Board of
Educ., 514 N.E.2d 1109 (N.Y. 1987).
164. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-a(4) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993).
1992]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
assuring, at all times, the orderly and uninterrupted operations and
functions of government."'
1 6 5
The Taylor Law likewise reflects New York's history of public sec-
tor labor strife and the disruption of vital government services that
compelled the statute's adoption. 66 Additionally, for twenty-five
years now, a body of decisional and administrative law construing and
applying the Taylor Law has developed. Surely, that body of law
should be at least as influential in resolving issues under the Taylor
Law as Supreme Court decisions interpreting entirely different
statutes.
Finally, the duty of fair representation, only implied in the federal
private sector labor statutes, is now explicit in the Taylor Law. The
1990 amendment to the state statute makes a breach of the duty of
fair representation one of three "improper employee organization
practices. "167 The existence of the duty of fair representation under
the Taylor Law no longer depends upon inference or theoretical con-
struct. It is an express, integral part of the statutory scheme. This
codification of the duty of fair representation would certainly suggest
that it be given full - and not begrudging - effect.
These foregoing factors, among others, would seem to dictate in-
dependent interpretation and application of the Taylor Law. At the
least, these factors would seem clearly to demonstrate that slavish
adoption of Supreme Court standards is inappropriate. There is, of
course, a ready analogue to this recommended independence. It is
state constitutional law. New York, and specifically the Court of Ap-
peals, has a long and proud tradition of protecting individual free-
doms as a matter of state law, and thus, independent of Supreme
Court interpretation of the federal constitution. 168  Safeguarding
rights and liberties under the state constitution insures that the state's
fundamental law reflects the state's fundamental values and princi-
ples. New York's courts and administrative agencies should rely on
such factors as the text and intent of specific provisions of the New
York Constitution, on state history and traditions, on the attitudes,
165. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1983).
166. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 7, 110.
168. See generally William M. Wiecek, State Protection of Personal Liberty: Remem-
bering the Future, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS 371 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991); Vincent M. Bonventre,
State Constitutionalism in New York" A Non-Reactive Tradition, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31 (1989); see also Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional
Guarantees and the Protection of Defendants' Rights: The Case of New York, 1968-1978,
28 BUFF. L. REV. 157 (1979).
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interests, concerns and character of the state's people, and on state
statutory and decisional law as well as other evidence of strong state
policy. The lowest national common denominator applied by the
Supreme Court must not be the final authority.
Nor should the Supreme Court's drastically diluted duty of fair
representation under the NLRA be deemed authoritative for New
York's Taylor Law. Rather, standards developed to resolve public
sector labor disputes in the state, such as those forged by PERB in a
quarter-century of decision-making, are more appropriate. Surely,
they are more reflective of New York's policies, principles and experi-
ence in public, as opposed to private, sector labor.
PERB's Nassau Educational Chapter test, which states that "im-
properly motivated" or "grossly negligent or irresponsible" conduct
constitutes unfair representation, 69 provides some genuine guarantee
to employees of "good faith" 110 and "serious attention" 7 ' by their
exclusive bargaining representatives. That test contrasts favorably
with the mere shell of a duty of fair representation, the "wholly irra-
tional" or "invidious" criteria, currently applied by the Supreme
Court under federal law. 172 Moreover, PERB is the agency specifi-
cally charged with implementing and applying the Taylor Law in ad-
judicating public employee claims.1 73 Consequently, PERB's test is
born of experience and familiarity with, and wisdom and insight into,
New York's law and New York's problems and particular
circumstances.
PERB's test is also faithful to the Taylor Law's express command
that federal private sector labor decisions and law shall not be re-
garded as binding, 7 4 and that the "fundamental distinctions between
private and public employment" be recognized. 175 Most critical
among these distinctions are the vulnerability of public employees to
the political process in setting terms and conditions of employment,
and the prohibition against public employee strikes.1 76 These factors
make good faith, responsible, and competent representation of public
employees by their unions imperative under the Taylor Law. A
meaningful guarantee of fair representation, conscientiously enforced
169. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
173. See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 205 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993).
174. See supra notes 54-55, 164 and accompanying text.
175. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209-a(4) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993); see also supra
notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 45-47, 51 and accompanying text.
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through the application of firm standards, is essential to ensure that
the interests of public employees "receive adequate consideration."' 77
Finally, unlike the rather meager standards set by the Supreme
Court, the duty of fair representation criteria developed by PERB are
responsive to the very concerns that led to the Taylor Law's adoption
in New York. As recently recalled by the Court of Appeals, wide-
spread strikes prior to the Taylor Law's enactment had been fueled by
"a feeling of futility on the part of public employees;"'' 7 8 a primary
purpose of New York's statute was, consequently, "to secure fair
treatment" for government workers.' 79 PERB's Nassau Educational
Chapter test insures a real measure of "fair treatment" by putting
some teeth into the duty of fair representation under the Taylor Law.
It also frees public sector labor relations in New York from the ebb
and flow of the federal standards, which have seemed more dependent
upon changing Supreme Court attitudes toward the duty of fair repre-
sentation than upon the fundamental protective purpose of the duty
of fair representation to be a "bulwark" for employees."8 '
Just as New York has been independent in safeguarding individual
rights and liberties as a matter of state constitutional dictate,1 8 1 so too
should New York be independent in safeguarding the rights of its
public employees under the Taylor Law - including the right to fair
representation by exclusive bargaining agents.
177. Summers, supra note 44, at 1161.
178. Association of Surrogates v. New York, 577 N.E.2d 10, 14 (N.Y. 1991) (quoting
GOVERNOR'S COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, Final Report, at 42
(1966)).
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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